<?xml version="1.0" encoding="iso-8859-1"?>
<feed xmlns:bsl="http://www.bsl.nl" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><logo>http://www.bsl.nl/frameset/algemene_header_bsl_websites.gif</logo><title>Netherlands Journal of Psychology</title><subtitle>Aanvulling 3, September 2008</subtitle><id>urn:bsl:0028-2235</id><link rel="self" href="http://vb23.bsl.nl/frontend/xml/0028-2235.xml"/><link href="http://" rel="alternate"/><rights>Copyright 2007, Bohn Stafleu van Loghum, Houten</rights><updated>2008-09-09T01:00:00Z</updated><author><name>Bohn Stafleu van Loghum</name><uri>http://www.bsl.nl</uri></author><entry><title>A cognitive neuropsychological approach to false memory: Korsakoff patients and the DRM paradigm</title><link type="text/html" rel="alternate" href="http://www.bsl.nl/updatealert/default.asp?page=0028-2235/09014f3c802209fe.html"/><id>urn:dctm:chron_id:09014f3c802209fe</id><bsl:issn>0028-2235</bsl:issn><bsl:volume>64</bsl:volume><bsl:issue>3</bsl:issue><bsl:date>September 2008</bsl:date><bsl:author><name>Ilse Van Damme</name></bsl:author><bsl:author><name>Géry d&#8217;Ydewalle</name></bsl:author><updated>2008-09-09T01:00:00Z</updated><content type="html" xml:lang="nl">&lt;img src="http://vb23.bsl.nl/BSL/content/edition/0028-2235/0028-2235.jpg" align="right" hspace="10"/&gt;&lt;b&gt;Ilse Van Damme, Géry d&#8217;Ydewalle&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Although memory is a crucial part of virtually every aspect of day-to-day life, the use of the simple truth &#8216;I remember it; therefore it happened&#8217; (Tulving, 2002, p. 272) is not as justified as it may seem. Not only do people forget things that did happen, they also remember things that did not happen or remember them differently from the way in which they happened (Roediger &amp; McDermott, 1995). When the latter occurs, they are said to produce &#8216;false&#8217; memories.&lt;p&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;small&gt;&lt;b&gt;Copyright 2007, Bohn Stafleu van Loghum, Houten&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content></entry><entry><title>The frontal laterality of emotion: a historical overview</title><link type="text/html" rel="alternate" href="http://www.bsl.nl/updatealert/default.asp?page=0028-2235/09014f3c80220a07.html"/><id>urn:dctm:chron_id:09014f3c80220a07</id><bsl:issn>0028-2235</bsl:issn><bsl:volume>64</bsl:volume><bsl:issue>3</bsl:issue><bsl:date>September 2008</bsl:date><bsl:author><name>Dennis Hofman</name></bsl:author><updated>2008-09-09T01:00:00Z</updated><content type="html" xml:lang="nl">&lt;b&gt;Dennis Hofman&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br/&gt;One of the most successful cortical centred theories in affective and social neuroscience is the frontal asymmetry of emotion model. In 1978, Richard Davidson presented a paper describing relationships between the experience of emotions and differential patterns of asymmetrical frontal brain activity (Allen &amp; Kline, 2004). Davidson demonstrated that the left prefrontal cortex (PFC) was involved in the processing of positive emotions, whereas the right PFC was involved in the processing of negative emotions. Interestingly, his proposal was against the prevailing theory that the right hemisphere was involved in emotional processing exclusively (Luys, 1881). The abstract of his presentation was among the first publications describing the use of the electroencephalogram (EEG) in cortical laterality research on emotions (Davidson, Schwartz, Saron, Bennett, &amp; Goleman, 1979). Particularly in the last ten years, Davidson&#8217;s frontal lateralisation model has been extensively investigated and new insights have contributed to the development of alternative frontal lateralisation models of emotions. The aim of this paper is to provide a brief historical overview of the cortical lateralisation theories of emotion.&lt;p&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;small&gt;&lt;b&gt;Copyright 2007, Bohn Stafleu van Loghum, Houten&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content></entry><entry><title>Perceiving motion: relativity, illusions and the nature of perception</title><link type="text/html" rel="alternate" href="http://www.bsl.nl/updatealert/default.asp?page=0028-2235/09014f3c80220a0e.html"/><id>urn:dctm:chron_id:09014f3c80220a0e</id><bsl:issn>0028-2235</bsl:issn><bsl:volume>64</bsl:volume><bsl:issue>3</bsl:issue><bsl:date>September 2008</bsl:date><bsl:author><name>Alexander H. Wertheim</name></bsl:author><updated>2008-09-09T01:00:00Z</updated><content type="html" xml:lang="nl">&lt;b&gt;Alexander H. Wertheim&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Motion, stationarity, velocity and the direction of motion are relative concepts. Physicists only discuss motion as relative to the frame of reference which defines that particular motion. We may drive at 100 miles an hour (relative to the road), and at the same time remain stationary (relative to another car driving next to us at the same speed). If the other car moves faster than we do, we move backward relative to it, and when it moves slower we move forward relative to it, which illustrates that motion is a symmetrical concept. A moving relative to B physically means the same as B moving relative to A. &lt;p&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;small&gt;&lt;b&gt;Copyright 2007, Bohn Stafleu van Loghum, Houten&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content></entry></feed>
